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This paper analyzes GATI' and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of
a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An
explicit agreement, such as OAT!', may be violated at some positive cost in addition to
retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from
'international obligation," a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GAY!'.
We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GAIT-DSP: unilateral
retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.
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1. Introduction
Post-WWfl tariff history is characterized not only by trade liberalization
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but also protectionist
episodes in which countries suspended tariff concessions (or appeared to violate
GATT rules in other ways). In some instances, protectionist episodes have been
resolved without resort to GATI legal proceedings, but in over two hundred cases,
countries have initiated GAT1' dispute settlement procedures (DSP) under Articles
XXII or XXIII. In this paper we examine a theoretical trade model which
incorporates both the trade liberalization and DSP aspects of GAiT. We focus on
how tariff cooperation is affected by the existence of a legal agreement such as GATT
and by the structure of its dispute settlement procedures. Economic models often
abstract from these issues, but legal experts make frequent reference to the
importance of GATT as a legal obligation. Moreover, governments perceive
weaknesses in DSP as the key to enforcement problems in GATI'.
Existing studies take several approaches to modeling trade liberalization. In
one approach, tariff determination is modeled as a cooperative game in which
binding agreements can be made and enforced. This approach is taken by Mayer
(1981), Riezrnart (1982), and Chan (1988) and has the appealing interpretation that
reduced tariffs come out of negotiations. The problem with this approach is that
although GATT represents a legal obligation, its rules are not directly enforceable in
most of its member countries (Hudec (1986, 1990c), Jackson (1979, 1989))1 Because of
this, Dixit (1987), Bagwell and Staiger (1990), and Riezman (1991) adopt
noncooperative approaches to explaining tariffs. These studies examine when
tAlthough GATT rules are legally binding, they are directly enforceable in domestic courts only when they
have been incorporated into domestic law. None of the Articles of GATF provide for disputes to be taken to the
World Court. See Jackson (1989) on how this relates to the origins of GAD' and unsuccessful attempts to set up
the International Trade Organization (ITO).
2cooperation can be sustained in infinitely repeated tariff games where tariffs are
determined noncooperatively (i.e. when zero or low tariffs are the result of implicit
cooperation).2 Low tariff levels are supported along the equilibrium path by the
threat of punishing any cheating' by reverting to retaliatory" subgame
(equilibrium) paths with lower payoffs. Dixit's focus is on free trade as a
noncooperative equilibrium, but periods of both high and low tariffs can occur in
equilibrium in Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Riezman (1991). Equilibria in all
three games are self-enforcing, so that there is no role for an independent
enforcement mechanism or explicit international agreement. Thus they give no
insight into the role of GATT as an explicit agreement or the role of GATT DSP.
Only a few tariff models incorporate DSP. Ludema (1990) incorporates the
notion of DSP by restricting the equilibria in an infinitely repeated tariff game to be
renegotiation-proof. In this game, if a country deviates from the cooperative tariff,
any retaliation must be approved by both the deviating and retaliating country.
Modeled in this way, DSP has the effect of making potential retaliation less severe
than otherwise, so that within any given class of feasible punishments, the lowest
supportable equilibrium tariffs are higher than without DSP. Hungerford (1990)
incorporates DSP in a model of tariff and nontariff barriers. In his model, countries
can punish cheating only by initiating a costiy investigation of foreign actions.
Because potential punishment is less severe, the equilibria involve higher levels of
nontariff barriers than without DSP. Thus DSP has detrimental effects in both
studies.
What are the implications of this work for the Uruguay Round? It is clearly
unrealistic to think of countries setting up anything like an independent
2Bajdwin sad Clsrk (1987) examine both cooperative and noncooperative equilibria. Jensen and Thuraby
(1984) examine implicit cooperation in a finitely-repeated context. Stahl and Turunen-Red (t990) examine
cooperation when govemment policy changes randomly.
3enforcement agency, hence any intuition must come from noncooperative models.
These models (in particular, those of Ludema and Hungerford) suggest that more
cooperation would be forthcoming irs GAIT if DSP were simply eliminated. This is
difficult to believe given the importance negotiators attach to its reform. In both the
Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, most governments claimed that successful
negotiations would be contingent on DSP reform3. A more likely scenario is that
the existing models are too abstract to be useful in evaluating current negotiations.
This paper bridges the gap between the cooperative and noncooperative
approaches to trade liberalization. In cooperative models agreements are binding,
and hence infinitely costly to violate. One often thinks of these agreements as being
explicit, detailed contracts. In noncooperative models, agreements are not binding
(and hence may be costiessly violated), but are enforced through the future actions
of the involved agents. Often, these agreements are taken to be implicit and
noncontractual.
In the pages to follow, we corsstuct a supergame model of international trade
featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. Our marriage4 of the cooperative
and noncooperative approaches assumes that an explicit agreement, such as GATT,
may be violated at some finite, but positive, cost; this cost is incurred in addition to
any change in future actions that might be induced by such a violation. We
interpret this cost as arising from "international obligation, a concept familiar to
scholars of international law, but to our knowledge, not widely analyzed by
3We have modeled She inclusion or omission of DSP as an exogenous decision, although it could be
thought of as a decision made at a pre.supergarne stage. The motivation for this approach is that GATT negotiations
are conducted in distinct negotiating rounds so that GATT rules adjust slowly to world market conditions; much
more slowly then the rapid-paced change in the nature and frequency of trade disputes. Rod Ludems, in suggesting
thae perhaps decisions regarding the DSP should be viewed as arising endogenously, has pointed Out that abolishing
DSP would be a time inconsistent policy. However, when explaining the endogenous determination of institutions
within this framework, it is not clear to us what lime inconsistency means. If the decision to agree upon
institutions can itself be subject to trigger-type punishments, then it appears as if the esdogenous determination of
institutions may become a problem of infinite regress in the endogenous determination of the rules of the game.
4We thank Rod Ludema for suggesting this term.
4economists. International obligation acts as a cost imposed upon any country
violating an explicit international agreement . The cost is incurred regardless of
whether such violations are detected or punished.
In section 2 we explain in more detail what is meant by international
obligation. In subsequent sections we explore the implications of incorporating
international obligation in our noncooperative tariff model. We focus on how
international obligation affects two "real world' aspects of GATT-DSP: unilateral
retaliation as well as use of the DSP and the effect of inordinate delays in the
operation of DSP.
2. International Obligation, GAIT-DSP and Retaliation
Although GATT rules are not directly enforceable in domestic courts, they do
represent legally binding obligations. To the extent that governments try to settle
disputes through GAIT-DSP (rather than unilaterally retaliating), it is clear they
take this international obligation seriously. As noted above, governments have
initiated GATT legal proceedings in over two hundred disputes. Legal experts refer
to international obligation as a crucial element in enforcement of GAIT rules. For
example, Hudec (1990c, pp. 12 and 14) notes.
True, like the Pope, international law has no army. But the Pope still
makes a pretty good living without one. And so does international
legal obligation. Governments do respond, not invariably but more
than just occasionally. The greater a government's own reliance on
the system of international rules in question, the more influence such
obligations will have over its conduct... Governments are assuming
that enforcement of GAIT legal rulings will continue to rely on the
twin engines of international obligation and retaliation.
Similarly, Jackson (1989, p. 83) notes
It is important for the policy advisor, the statesman, or the practitioner
to accurately evaluate the real impact of the international rules
recognizing that some of those rules do have considerable effect and
5influence on real government and business decisions. For example,
despite cynical statements by members of the U.S. Congress that GATI'
rules are "irrelevant," there are a number of proven instances when
congressional committees and their staff members have taken
considerable trouble to tailor legislative proposals so as to minimize
the risk of a complaint to GAIT
Although international obligation tends to be ignored in economic models, it
provides an interesting interpretation for several computational studies. Brown
and Whalley (1980) used a general equilibrium model to calculate welfare effects of
Tokyo Round tariff cuts. One of their most striking results was that countries
gained more from tariff-cutting proposals other than their own. For example, the
United States gained more from the Japanese proposal than its own. The EC gained
more from any proposal other than its own. Baldwin and Clarke (1987) found
similar results in their study of Tokyo Round tariff-cutting proposals. One
interpretation of these results is that standard welfare measures don't adequately
capture government objectives in setting trade policy. As noted by McMillan (1988),
tariff-cutting formulae may have been motivated by employment or industry
objectives, rather than aggregate country welfare. Alternatively, if countries take
international obligation seriously, they may formulate negotiating proposals with
that in mind.
If international obligation plays a role in enforcing GATT rules, it must do so
by affecting not only the incentives for countries to violate rules, but also retaliation
to apparent violations. The GATT-DSP is clearly intended to provide alternatives
to retaliation as an enforcement mechanism. Article XXIII allows for consultation
among disputing countries, and Article XXIII provides for panels to investigate and
rule on alleged violations. Although retaliation can be recommended under Article
XXIII procedures, this has occurred only once in GATT history. When disputes are
settled through working parties, countries are often encouraged to negotiate
settlements. In this case, the disputing parties may agree on some form of
retaliation (as in the Japanese leather dispute listed in Table I below). In many cases,
6however, countries simply agree to terminate the policies in question, or they agree
on suitable compensation. This presumably is why previous attempts to model DSP
have done so in ways that limit retaliation.
Nonetheless, there is nothing in GATT to prevent retaliation. It is easy to
find cases in GATT history where countries retaliate without filing disputes, as well
as cases where they file disputes but eventually retaliate because of extraordinary
delays in the legal process. Table I presents ten cases of U.S. retaliatory actions
between 1974 and 1989. All of these cases involved retaliation under U.S. Section
301 law. In half of the cases, the United States retaliated without filing a GATT
dispute. In two of these, disputes were filed eventually against the United States for
its retaliatory actions. In the Japanese semiconductor case, the United States had
increased tariffs on $300 million of imports from Japan in response to alleged
Japanese violation of a bilateral semiconductor agreement. In the other case, Brazil
filed a dispute in response to U.S. tariff retaliation to alleged inadequate patent
protection in pharmaceuticals. In the rest of the cases listed, retaliation occurred
after the United States had filed a dispute. In the Japanese leather case, this
retaliation was GATT-legal in the sense that it occurred after the panel report and
was mutually agreeable to both parties. However, the other cases involved
unilateral retaliation before successful completion of the legal process. In the case of
wheat flour, a retaliatory subsidy was instituted two months before the panel ruling.
In the other cases, the United States retaliated after panel reports were blocked by the
European Community.
Notice the contrast between this dispute history and the way DSP has been
modeled. Neither Ludema (1990) nor Hungerford (1990) incorporate the type of
delay in retaliation that occurs when countries follow CAn-DSP. Moreover, their
models do not capture the variety of options countries have taken in settling
disputes. In reality, countries have followed CATT-DSP in some cases, while in
7others they retaliated quickly to apparent violations, or retaliated when the GATT
legal process stalled (either due to delays or blocked reports). These features should
be incorporated in any model of DSP since much of the dissatisfaction with GATT-
DSP concerns either delays or unilateral retaliation. We shall consider both aspects
of DSP in Section 4B.
3. Implicit Cooperation in a GATT-less World
A. The Model
We examine implicit tariff cooperation in an infinitely repeated game. The
constituent game is one in which two countries, 1 and 2, choose tariff levels . e
[O,) to maximize a one-period utility function, where e =
2
(e1,02) is an unobserved random variable in R÷. We abstract from whether this
function is an index of aggregate utility (as in Dixit (1987)) or the indirect utility of
interest groups that influence tariff policy. We make standard trade-theoretic
assumptions on the derivatives of u with respect to own and foreign tariffs5, and on
the random variable in order to ensure the existence of a static best response
function t(t) that is well-behaved in the sense that the best response functions
generate a unique non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in tariffs; Let U(t) =U (t(t),t)
denote country is static best-response payoff, and let and U denote the one shot
Nash equilibrium tariffs and payoffs for i = 1,2, respectively.
The tariff game is infinitely repeated with per period payoffs denoted by
where = 0lt'02t are iid across periods. Taking the other
country's supergame strategy as given, each country chooses its strategy to maximize
its discounted expected utility,
5Tha1 is, each country's utility is increasing in its own tariff given a zero foreign tariff, arid each country's
utility is decreasing in the foreign tariff.
8E[Z tu(tte)] (1)
where JIci is the common discount factor.
We define a contingent strategy to be an infinite sequence s = such
that = and for t> 0, sit: x 2t IR÷. Let S be an arbitrary subset of the set
of such contingent strategies, S. s determines country is tariff level at time t as a
function of the history of tariffs levied by both countries in periods 0 t—l and past
realizations of a pair of summary statistics o5(ti5,t259i5O25) s = O,...t—1, i = 1,2.
Call the history of past tariffs and summary statistic realizations up to time t, H.
One example of such a strategy arises in Riezman (1991) where tariff levels are
assumed to be unobservable. In this case country is period t action is not directly
dependent on past tariff levels, but depends only on the observed sequence of
country 2 imports, where period t imports are a function of c1, t2, and ø. Hence
the contingent strategies in Riezman are restricted to a set S of strategies that are
independent of past tariffs. Another example would arise in a model in which
tariffs are observable but the per period utility function arises from a random
political process which dictates the weights of various interest groups in
determining trade policy. In this case, allowing period t tariffs to be contingent upon
i = 1,2, could represent the dependence of the governments'
policies on a random process of political influence.6
A contingent strategy pair 5l'' determines a stochastic process of summary
statistics and tariffs. Denote the expectation of this process by E5*,5*. A Nash
** *
. .12
equihbrium in S is a pair of contingent strategies 1'2' 5 S satisfying.
E * * [Z u• (s (H1),s2 (H)1'52t=O it t
6This is in the spirit of Feensira and Lewis (1987) where governments face varying degrees of protectionists
political pressure at home or Jensen and Thursby (1990) where a random political process influence which interest
group's preferences to follow when levying tariffs.
9 E [ u(s (H1)sj (Hi), 8)] Vs e S i=1,2 (2)
As do Green and Porter (1984) and Riezman (1990), we focus on contingent
strategies that involve reverting to the one shot Nash equilibrium for T—1 periods,
starting at time t+1 if the observed summary statistic at time t is in a certain set,7
Specifically let = (wi1(i,t2,Oi1,O2). O)2t('cit,t2t,eit02t)) e c trigger such a
reversion. We are interested in determining when a profile of low "cooperative"
tariffs (t1,c2) can be supported as an equilibrium choice in "normal" periods by the
threat of T-1 period reversion. Define period t to be normal if one of the following
holds: (a) t = 0, or (b) t—l was normal and t—1 Q, or (c) t—T was normal and tatT E
0. Otherwise t is reversionary.
A pair of tariffs (t1,c2) that are lower than the one-shot equilibrium tariff
levels can be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium by such a "trigger strategy
if the one-period gain from deviating to a higher tariff does not outweigh the
potential loss from increasing the probability of triggering reversion.8 Let F('r1,'2) be
the probability that t(tl,r2,Olt,O2t) 0. Since . = 01t'02t are iid across periods, F
depends only upon the tariff levels set, and is not time dependent. 1—F(t1,'c2) is the
probability that the punishment of reverting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium for
T-1 periods is imposed. We assume that 0 is chosen in such a way that F is
decreasing in 'ri, so that the probability of punishment is increasing in 'rj.
7Therc is nothing sacred about Nash reversion. Most, if not all of our qualitative insights would apply to a
wide range of reversionary strategies. However, non-Nash reversion does make the treatment of demons in Section
3Biii considerably more complicated.
8We have ignored here the issue of renegotiation proofness analyzed elsewhere (see Ludema (1990). One
implication of incorporating renegotiation is that the ability to credibly punish may be severely restricted, because of
the ability to renegotiate away from undesirable subgaine perfect equilibria, thereby making initial cooperation more
diffucult. While this concept is rather elegant mathematically, we are not sure as to the importance of this
phenomenon. Our feeling is that other factors such as revenge, which is more difficult to model mathematically,
may tend to bias outcomes in the other direction, allowing punishments not only worse than standard renegotiation
proof equilibria, but also subgame perfect equilibria in general. A more thorough treatment of revenge would have
to await a more thorough theory of games in which preferences over Outcomes depend on the complete game tree
itself, as well as the strategies and path followed. In the context of this paper it might suffice to say that a country
(or policymaker) may actually derive utility from punishing a "cheater and hence may have preferences over, say,
per period trade flows that are not history independent.
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Given this probabilistic punishment, the value to country i from setting a
level of protection t given that country jhas set tj is
= + (l_F(i,cj))( Zt u +Tv.(.tj)) + (3)
1=
which, after rearrangement, gives
— U
V(t.,t)=— + (4)1 1
+ F(t1,t)(T_)
An implicitly cooperative agreement (t,t) is supported as a noncooperative
equilibrium by this T-1 period trigger if
V. (t,4)  V1(tc) Vt. 1=1,2, (5)
y imposing conditions on the function F(t1t) and U1, we can represent a
noncooperative equilibrium as a solution to the pair of first order conditions,
Vi
—(t ,t.) =0, i=i,2,j*i, which can be wntten as
aF('tr)
[l_3T+F(t)(l3T_l)] + = 0 (6)
i=1,2,
It the punishment and trigger probabilities support art equilibrium more
cooperative than the one-shot Nash equilibrium, the first term is positive because of
the static incentive to increase the tariff above The second term is negative since
F is decreasing in
9when first order condidons are not sufficient, the condiLion (5) reduces to
[U.(t,t)—U.(t.,t)] (l T).(J3T) (tu-.u] F(t., [U.(.,t)—U] Fc,t))  0
Vt. i=1,2 ji
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B. Special Cases
(I) T=oo
Suppose that the reversionary periods are grim trigger strategies (T=o').
Then
'4 Uc,t) —V.(t.t.)=— + (7)1 J
and the equilibrium conditions are adjusted accordingly.
(ii) Complete Information or Certain Punishment
Suppose = i=l,2, and that the trigger set fl is the set
{(1.t2): t1>c or t2>t2). Then the model outlined reduces to the complete
information trigger strategy model with T—1 period reversion.
(iii) Demons
In the model outlined so far, in equilibrium countries know the tariffs that
are set. Whether or not tariffs are observable, countries can deduce tariff levels in
equilibrium. If a punishment path is initiated, it is initiated despite the fact that no
deviation from the implicitly cooperative tariff occurs. Reversionary periods are
triggered by bad realizations of the random variable rather than "cheating" on
cooperative tariffs.
In a GATT-less world, such a motivation for reversionary periods is not
unduly restrictive. However, many GATT disputes involve panel investigations of
whether deviations from tariff bindings are legitimate (for example, in escape
clauses actions) or whether they are true deviations from the agreement. In order to
analyze the role of DSP in such determinations, the basic model must allow for
deviations from cooperative tariffs in equilibrium. One way to do this is to extend
the model is to allow reversionary periods to be triggered by a random deviation by
one country from the implicitly cooperative tariff level. In this way, the decision to
12
punish by reverting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium may be the result of a
deviation from the implicitly cooperative tariff level (i.e. "cheating") or it may not.
We model these random deviations by borrowing from Segerstrom (1988) the
notion of a demon.' We assume that, in each period, with probability 1—a country
I plays a static best response to country 2s equilibrium action for that period. When
this happens, country I is possessed (temporarily) by a demon.' Of course, when
the countries are in a period of reversion to the static Nash equilibrium, the
possessed and unpossessed are indistinguishable. We will generally take 1—a to be
small, representing a small amount of irrationality.
Suppose t is the proposed implicitly cooperative tariff level of country 2.
Country l's discounted expected utility as a function of its own tariff level, 'ri,
becomes
c c Rc
V1('c1, c,) = c U1(c1, 'C2) + (1—a) U1 (c2) +
+F(t1,t)V1(1,t (8)
+ (1)[(1-F(t1 (4)t)) + T V1(t1, 'C)} + (4)4) V1(t1, 4)
Define
V1(t1, 4), a U1(1, 4) + (1) (4). F(c1) F(t1, 4) and F
F('c1 (c2)c2).
Then
(9)i- ÷(T)[(t)a+P(1)I
Country 2 is never possessed with a demon and, hence, for any proposed
cooperative tariff pair ('t, 4), 4 must maximize.
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C C C
V2(t1, t2) — t U2('t1, t2) + (1—e)U2(t1 (t2),t2)
+ a [(1-F(t, t2)){ + T V2(, t2)} + t2)V2(t, (10)
+ (1) [(1_F(1(4),t)){ + T V2(t, t2)} + F(1(t),2) V2(t, t2)1
Collecting terms, an expression analogous to (9) may be obtained.
4. The World According to GATT
A. International Obligation
We model international obligation by assuming that countries bear a cost
when they deviate from the GATT-determined cooperative tariff levels, (4,4). in
cooperative periods or from GATT specified strategies in reversionary periods. In
the political economy interpretation of this model, we can think of this disutility as
a loss of goodwill in the international arena or the political embarrassment that
comes from being suspected of violations, regardless of whether retaliation is
actually triggered. In the imperfect monitoring interpretation of the model, the
disutility could be viewed as a domestic political cost or loss of goodwill within an
internal circle of policymakers.1° Finally, as in other human endeavors, this cost
could be interpreted simply as the disutility of a 'guilty conscience" arising from the
violation of an agreement (and incurred even if the violation is undetected).
We examine three possible forms that this disutility might take: (i) A fixed
cost c incurred by a country the first time it deviates (with future deviations
generating no disutility); (ii) A fixed cost that is incurred after the initial deviation
t0This latter interpretation, while perhaps less appealing than the political economy interpretation, does not
requite that other counales observe the violation.
14
and upon the first deviation after any reversionary period;11 and (iii) A cost c
incurred by a country in every period in which it deviates from GATT-determined
tariff levels. Note that if the punishment period is T = alternatives (i) and (ii)
coincide, If punishments are certain,12 then (ii) and (iii) coincide. In the version of
the model with a demon, we shall assume that being a demon means not incurring
a cost; that is, demons feel no international obligation.
First we examine a fixed cost, as in case (i), for the basic model without
demons. In this case, equation (4) remains as before for c =tf, where 4 denotes the
GATT-determined cooperative tariff. But for 'c 4
o
U(tt) — Uj'
+ T T (11)11
_3 1—[3 +F(t., t)(f3 —13)
Hence, the cost incurred in violating GAfl rules simply shifts down the function
V.(t.,t.) for if, generating a discontinuity in the function at if. If the fixed cost is
incurred in every period of deviation, as in case (hi), equation (4) remains as before
for c = if, but for c. if
o uf4 lJ(ipi) — c —
+ m 1' (12)11 i—[3 1—j3 +F(i., txil —ii)1 J
Hence, a discontinuity remains at c = cf. but the effect on VCci) for i cf is no
longer a constant shift down.
These two cost formulations allow us to illustrate an important principle
governing the role of CAn-determined tariffs in a world with implicit cooperation.
If these tariffs are set too low, international obligation may be ineffective in
ttln the event of probabilistic retaliation, deviations that occur after an unpunished deviation incur no cost.
t2In the imperfect monitoring interpretation of the game, this means information is complete.
15
achieving lower cooperative tariffs. To illustrate this, suppose that the implicitly
cooperative tariff levels in a GATT-less world, (t,4). are greater than zero. This
implies that V.(O,O) < V.(r.,O) for some > 0, as shown in Figure 1. Suppose the
GATT-determined tariff level is zero (i.e. t= 4 = 0). In this case, the international
obligation induced by GATT may or may not be sufficient to enforce free trade as an
implicitly cooperative outcome. Figure Ia depicts a situation where V1(O,O) > V,0)
V so that free trade can be enforced. In other situations international obligation
may not sufficiently reduce the gain from deviating from free trade, and the
relevant value functions would be depicted by Figure lb. In the latter case, there
will generally be some tariff level lower than the GATT-less implicitly
collusive level, which, if specified as the GATT-determined cooperative
tariff level, would be immune to deviation. This is depicted in Figure lc. Hence, a
properly chosen GATT tariff can lead to greater cooperation, but attempts to reduce
tariff levels too much may lead to cooperative tariff levels no lower than in a
GATT-less world.
Indeed, the danger from GATT-determined tariffs being too low is even more
striking if international obligation imposes costs in each period (as in case (lii)). In
that case, when GATT-determined tariffs are not enforceable, then the existence of
GATT-determined obligation may cause the most collusive (implicitly cooperative)
tariff levels to increase. For any given tariff of country j,
sgn = (13)dt.
T T N T
sgn
.
' [l-.3 + F(t1t)(1l —fi)] — [U(t1cj)—c—U ]
Hence, for any cooperative tariff level, if country is best response satisfies the first
16
dV°Ct.,t.)
order condition, dt
=0, totally differentiating this equation yields
dt1 (2FQt,c.) T
sgn (-)=sgn at (3 —3) > 0. (14)
An increase in c will cause country is optimal tariff response to a tariff, t, to
increase. Intuitively, the dynamic optimal response t(t)balances the marginal
one-period gain to deviating from the cooperative tariff in a normal period with the
expected loss due to the increased probability of triggering a reversionary period. For
a given probability of reversion, this loss is reduced (due to the decrease in the
payoff from deviating) from U(tt) to U(t1t)—c. Hence, the marginal gain from
increasing t must be reduced to maintain equality. This is done by setting tat a
higher level.
A similar effect occurs in the presence of demons, in which case equation (9)
becomes
11(t1)-ct c-Ur
—
, (15)
+ @T_p) [F(t1) a + (l-a)]
where again the cost is as in case (iii). The interpretation of this effect remains the
same.
Finally, in the case of infinite horizon grim trigger strategies (T=oo) and certain
punishments, the representation of the cost of violating international obligation is
simplest. All three cost specifications coincide and GATT-determined tariff levels
can be supported if
Ut f)—c_uecftf)  —p-- tt—U) (16)
i=l,2, ji.
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To the extent that international obligation reduces the left-hand side of the
inequality, it facilitates tariff cooperation. Of course, if the cooperative tariff pair,
is so low that the inequality in (16) does not hold (for given il), then the
international obligation of GAIT has no effect.
B. The Dispute Settlement Procedure
Essential to the proper working of any agreement is an understanding as to
how disputes arising from the agreements provisions will be resolved. In
international agreements such as GATT, which are not enforced by outside
institutions, disputes are often resolved through negotiation between the parties
and threats of unilateral actions to back up a country's demands.
It seems reasonable to justify the inclusion of a dispute resolution procedure
in GATT by claiming that it would be difficult for any government to feel
international obligation if there were no such procedure. Having demonstrated the
benefits of international obligation it seems evident then that the existence of a DSP
is easily explained. In this section we ask how the characteristics of such a procedure
might enhance or hinder international cooperation. Given the observed
deficiencies in the DSP, it seems worthwhile to focus on two particular issues: the
problem of delay until punishment and the inability of the mechanism to properly
identify actual deviations from GAIT policy.
We deal first with the former. it is clear that in the context of our model any
mechanism that delays punishment or retaliation makes it more difficult to support
low tariff levels in a cooperative outcome.13 This is because, in equilibrium, the
one-period gain from cheating on cooperation is balanced by the potential loss from
triggering reversion. If reversion occurs with delay, not only is its cost lowered (due
t3See Abreu. Milgrom and Pearce (1991) fOr an example of a model in which this may not hol&
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to discounting), but also the deviating country may be able to benefit from its
deviation for a longer period.
To assess the effect of this delay, we look first at the model with grim trigger
strategies (T=oa) and certain punishments. In modeling a delay in punishment
within the CAfl system, it is not dear what tariffs should be assumed to be in place
between the time that a reversionary period is triggered and the punishment starts.
In a sense the status quo" should be maintained, but it is not clear whether this
could be equilibrium behavior. In the case of certain punishment the optimal
deviation from a GAYI tariff is to play a one-period best response t =rCcf). That is,De.if a deviation is desirable, the dynamic best response t = c is also the static best
response t (tf). When this is true, as long as a punishing country does not punish
outside of the GAfl system, a deviating country has no incentive to alter its strategy
in the period between the identification of cheating and the initiation of
punishment. At this point, we assume that all punishment is within the
framework of GAn. We will later remove this assumption, to determine whether
adhering to CAn-DSP is Nash equllibrium behavior when countries have the
option of punishing outside of the system.
Suppose punishment is delayed s periods and the cost structure of
international obligation is (i) or (ii). Then a cooperative tariff pair (44) can be
sustained in equilibrium if and only if
Z(Ul(4,4)—lJi(ti(tf)tf)) + (U(4,4) - (17)
or * *
s +1 s +1
— c + (1 ) (U.Cc.(cf)tf) — U(44))  ___ (1J(tf 4) — U) (18)
Clearly, an increase in s reduces the right-hand side of this inequality and increases
the left-hand side, making cooperation more difficult. The above formulation also
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easily accommodates stochastic delay until punishment, in which case E(+l)
replaces s+l For instance, s could be generated by a geometric or negative
binomial random variable. In the former case
E() = tp(1_p)tl = (19)
t=l l—(l—p)
* t—l
where Prob(s =t) = p(l—p) 0 <p < 1.
When international obligation imposes a cost as in (iii), the inequality in (18)
is altered, but the same qualitative result goes through. This is also true when
punishment is finite and uncertain or when demons are incorporated. Generally,
increasing s increases the value of c that maximizes V(t,cf). However, in these
cases the specification of the countries strategies in the interim period between the
identification of cheating and the onset of punishment is more complicated. Static
and dynamic best responses do not coincide and there is a non-trivial decision
whether to adhere to a GATT-determined policy during the period.
The issues of international obligation and delay until punishment interact in
affecting the choice to pursue remedies within the GATT system or outside of the
system. Due to international obligation, a decision to punish a deviating country
outside of the DSP guidelines imposes a cost on the country initiating the
punishment. This cost must be weighed against the losses that might occur due to
delay in punishment within the system, or possibly even a finding of no violation.'4
Again,we illustrate these considerations in the special case of certain
punishment and grim trigger strategies. Suppose that s, which may be
deterministic or random, is the period of time before punishment may be pursued
t4Donsestic laws such as U.S. Section 301 might be viewed as an attempt to lower this cost by
supplanting international obligation by domestic obligation
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within the DSP. If the cost to a punishing country from deviating from the DSP is a
one-time cost as in (i), the country will punish outside of the DSP if
(4t(tf)) + B2 (tft(tfD))  0 (20)
or + 3_5)
_j (tft(tfD)  0. (21)
For instance, when s is distributed according to a geometric distribution with
parameter p, E() = (p)/[l— (l—p)], and the above inequality becomes
1 N g g
—c + (U —U. (tj t.Cc )))  0. (22)l—13(l-p)
The inequality in (21) can be used to assess the benefit from punishing outside
of the DSP at any point in the DSP itself. Suppose a country has pursued a grievance
in the DSP up to some time t and let s represent the number of periods beyond
that the country must wait until the DSP allows punishment. Then the inequality
in (21) detennines whether it is worthwhile to punish outside of the procedure at t.
If the distribution of the punishment time exhibits a decreasing hazard rate then it is
possible that a country might pursue a grievance within the DSP and decide to
punish outside of the framework if the procedure has not specified a punishment by
the time t is reached.15 Hence, our formulation of the interaction of delay and
international obligation is consistent with the pursuit of punishment within the
DSP, punishment outside of the DSP, and a combination of both.
If the cost to a country punishing outside of the DSP is a per period cost as in
(iii) then the decision whether to punish within or outside of the mechanism is
independent of the anticipated delay until punishment. The payoff per period
t5As mentioned earlier, domestic legislation such as U.S. 301 may serve to precommit governments to
discount international obligation by requiring punishment after a certain time period. In this case, a coonlly might
pursue a grievance in the DSP but retaliate in a GAIT illegal fashion even without a decreasing hazard rate.
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obtained while waiting to be able to punish within the mechanism is
The payoff from punishing outside of the mechanism is U-c. Of course, once the
mechanism itself specifies a punishment, it is best for a country to punish within
the mechanism. This formulation of cost is then consistent with a policy of
punishing outside of the DSP while pursuing a grievance within the procedure.
The above discussion of the decision to punish within or outside of the DSP
must, of course, be taken into account when determining the gain to a country from
cheating on the GATT tariffs. The ability to punish outside of the DSP enhances the
ability to reach low cooperative tariff levels. Of course, under both specifications of
the cost of violating international obligation, a DSP that reached a verdict rapidly in
the event of a violation could possibly support even lower tariffs.
C. Identifying Violations
A feasible role for DSP, and one which it arguably was created to perform, is as
a monitoring device that distinguishes between true deviations from a cooperative
agreement and mistaken perceptions or claims that such a deviation has occurred.
These claims may be due to the imperfect observability of cheating or simply to
opportunistic behavior. In modeling a monitoring role for the DSP it seems
important to construct an analytical framework in which, in equilibrium, the
procedure may be justifiably triggered, due to deviations from an implicitly
cooperative agreement, and triggered when no actual deviation occurs. This creates
a nontrivial inference problem in resolving the dispute.
The extension of our basic model involving demons provides such a
framework. In an implicitly cooperative agreement in the demon model,
reversionary periods may be triggered following periods in which both countries
adhere to the agreement or they may be triggered due to the existence of a demon.
For simplicity, suppose that the implicitly cooperative tariff levels are the GATT
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levels, (P44) = (44). there is no delay until punishment if a violation is detected,
and the DSP detects violations instantaneously if a complaint is initiated. If the
countries set tariffs at (t1,t2), complaints wi)] be initiated with probability l—F(t1,t2).
If a complaint is initiated and no violation takes place Cr1 = r, i=l,2) then no
punishment occurs, and the countries continue in a normal period (setting 4).
Hence, allowing instantaneous and perfect determination of a violation if a
complaint is brought forward allows us to set F(4,4) F(4) = 1 in equation (15)
while maintaining FCt1) c 1 for other values. This raises the payoff to behaving
cooperatively, while allowing a non-zero probability of a violation (due to a demon)
and the resulting reversion that would occur.
Of course, the DSP is not instantaneous, nor does it perfectly separate
violations from compliance. To the extent that these imperfections exist, the
monitoring benefit of the procedure would be muted and perhaps even reversed
when erratic decisions and international obligation prevent countries from
punishing actual violators.
5. Conclusion
Previous theoretical treatments of GAfl (See Ludema (1990) and Hungerford
(199W) have provided a skeptical view of the role of GATT in facilitating trade
liberalization. We believe strongly that this view results directiy from the ease in
fitting the deficiencies of GATT and DSP into formal mathematical models and the
difficulty in formally modeling GATT benefits. Since countries clearly believe that
GAIT is important, it is hard to concur with the conclusion of these papers that
GAn restricts the ability to maintain low tariffs.
To model the benefits of GATT, we focus on the role of international
obligation. Roughly, international obligation is a perceived cost that is incurred if a
country deviates from an international agreement. In vague terms, it might be
viewed as the political equivalent of 'living with ones conscience." By including
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international obligation in a repeated game model of implicitly cooperative trade
agreements, we provide a parametric class of models spanning the range between
the standard noncooperative supergame models of implicit collusion, where
obligation is zero, and the cooperative game models of collusion, where obligation
is infinite (agreements are binding).'6 While we are aware of the limitations of such
brute force modeling, we think, as do legal experts who have written on the topic,
that it is international obligation that makes GATT and a DSP desirable, as long as
the DSP doesnt make identification and punishment of violators too difficult.
Taking the institution as given, our analysis shows that the GATT- specified
tariff levels are an important determinant of the degree to which the institution
facilitates international cooperation. If these tariff levels are unrealistically low
relative to the implicitly cooperative levels in the absence of GATT, the institution
will not aid in lowering tariffs (and, conceivably, could raise them). The DSP may
hinder the ability to cooperate by delaying punishment or making it more costly.
When this is true, punishment outside of GATT may work well as a second-best
mechanism to facilitate cooperation. By explicitly modeling these forces, we have
attempted to capture the essence of the twin engines of international obligation
and retaliation (Hudec, l990c, p. 14), which are emphasized in the legal literature.
Of course, institutions as complicated as the GATI' and DSP are reflections of
and are influenced by a vast array of factors not captured by these simple models.
Foremost among these factors is the fact that GATT itself is a nexus of contracts that
is incomplete in its coverage of future contingencies. This is, of course, a principal
reason why the DSP may be viewed as a major component of GATT; it is the
mechanism by which incomplete provisions of GAIT are completed. Given this
t6An anonymous referee has suggested that our formulation of the cost imposed by international obligation
is reminiscent of Cmwfords (1982) geatment of the cost of backing down from a precomntitted bargaining sunce in
the process of negotiation.
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role, it is quite possible that the original agreement would not have been signed
without the DSP.
We have also ignored other aspects of GATT that beg analysis. We have
chosen tariffs as the strategic choice of countries, although our analysis could be
carried out for a variety of instruments. Our analysis also focuses on bilateral, rather
than multilateral, conflict and cooperation. In a multilateral treatment, a
reputaUonal justification for international obligation might be possible. This would
address the current weakness of our reduced-form treatment of international
obligation. This, however, appears to be a formidable task.
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Table 1
Examples of Retaliation
U.S. 301 Cases
Original Action CountrY GATT
or Complaint 1E U.S. Retaliation Timing
Export subsidy on Export subsidy on Before panel
wheat flour EC Yes wheat flour report
Preferences EC Yes
on citrus
imports
Tariff on AfterEC
pasta block of
citrus panel
report
Export subsidy EC Yes
Nontariff Canada No Symmetric Not
measure nontariff applicable
barrier
Failure to Argentina No Termination Not
abide by of agreed applicable
bilateral tariff
agreement concessions
Quantitative Japan Yes U.S. tariff Agreement of
restrictions and Japanese U.S. & Japan
on leather tariff concession after panel
report
Failure to Japan Yes Tariff Not
abide by (Complaint applicable-
semiconductor filed by no ruling
agreement Japan on
U.S. tariff
retaliation)
EC tariffs EC No Tariff Not
on imports applicable
of Spain
Inadequate Brazil Yes Tariff Before panel
patent (Filed by
protection Brazil)
Import EC Yes Tariff Panel
ban on appointment
treated blocked
beef
Canadian government denied tax deductions to Canadian businesses
that advertised on U.S. border stations.
Sources: Hudec (1990'b) and Hamilton and Whalley (1991)
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